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Union ("CTU') evaluated the "tax-
sheltered annuity programs"
available to union employees. The
Hansen Report suggested that
VALIC used the "portfolio method"
while VALIC was actually using the
"banding method." Plaintiffs
maintained that VALIC did nothing
to remedy this discrepancy in their
reporting.
The court explained this holding
by citing Plaintiffs' failure to
authenticate the report which led to
the presumption that the Plaintiffs
relied on hearsay for their
argument. As Plaintiffs had failed to
assert an exception to the hearsay
rule, the district court had not
abused its discretion in excluding
this evidence. The court also struck
down the Plaintiffs' challenge
concerning the prospectus legends
by pointing to the express indication
on the legend that "no person had
the authority to give information or
to make representations with respect
to the 'offer contained in the
prospectus.'
Court Upheld Judgment in
Favor of VALIC Subsidiary
Plaintiffs also contested the
judgment in favor of VAMCO
issued by the trial court. The court
summarily dismissed this argument,
stating that since VAMCO operated
as a subsidiary of VALIC, and since
VALIC had withstood the previous
challenges from Plaintiffs, VAMCO
was necessarily free of fault as well.
In sum, the Seventh Circuit of
the United States Court of Appeals
sent a warning to investors with this
ruling that group participants will
be held to the express contracts that
they have made with their
investment companies.
Seventh Circuit Allowed Small Exception for Recovery
Under the Carmack Amendment
By James J. Chandler
In Gordon v. United Van Lines,
130 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1997), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit determined that
the Carmack Amendment to the
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 11707 (1994), governing
shippers' rights to recover common
carriers' losses to property,
preempted only state law claims
directly stemming from lost or
damaged cargo that had been
shipped interstate. In so finding, the
court recognized that the Carmack
Amendment did not preempt every
state law claim because a person
could still allege liability when his
claim did not arise from the "actual
loss of or damage to goods."
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Further, the Seventh Circuit held
that the Carmack Amendment
strictly prohibited the recovery of
punitive and emotional distress
damages. Last, the Seventh Circuit
found that based on the expert
testimony, the jury award was not
excessive.
United Van Lines Acted in
Bad Faith
Plaintiff Ruth Slavin ("Slavin'),
an 80 year-old widow, decided to
move from Florida to Chicago.
After meeting with a United Van
Lines' ("United") representative
twice, Slavin decided to hire the
company to move some boxes to her
new house and her most important
boxes to her daughter's, Rachelle
Gordon's ("Gordon'), house. The
latter boxes contained a large
number of photographs of historic
significance and personal value.
These historic photographs were
never insured because the United
representative, aware of Slavin's
limited mental and physical
capabilities, "wrote in the bill of
lading that Mrs. Slavin released
United from any liability for loss or
damage to the goods exceeding
$1,000." However, United admitted
at trial that it billed her for
"Replacement Cost Protection" with
a value of $10,000.
United's local agent, Cook
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Moving ("Cook"), delivered the
proper boxes to Slavin's house as
scheduled. The Cook delivery driver
promised Slavin that he would
deliver the rest of the boxes to her
daughter's house within minutes.
Hours later, Cook called Gordon
and told her that he would deliver
the boxes the next day in order to
avoid heavy traffic. Instead of
delivering the boxes to Gordon, the
Cook delivery driver paid forty
dollars to a day laborer, Tom Walker
("Walker"), to deliver the boxes;
but, Walker threw the boxes away.
When her mother's boxes did not
arrive, Gordon called Cook's
dispatcher who said that the boxes
were safe in the warehouse, the
delivery driver was out of town, and
that she would receive her boxes by
the end of the week. Over the next
three months, Cook repeatedly and
falsely assured Gordon that her
boxes were safe but never delivered
them. Finally, United admitted that
the boxes were lost and sent Gordon
a claim form. Consequently, Slavin
and Gordon ("Plaintiffs") filed an
eight count complaint under the
Carmack Amendment against
United Van Lines. The Carmack
Amendment to the Interstate
Commerce Act governs "liability
when property is delivered in
violation of routing instructions."
49 U.S.C. § 11707 (1994).
District Court Granted
Summary Judgment to
United on Seven of the Eight
Counts
The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois
granted United summary judgment
on seven of eight counts. The court
dismissed Plaintiffs' claim of
liability under the Bill of Lading
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 80115 (1998),
because "there was no private right
to sue under the Bill of Lading."
The District Court also determined
that the Carmack Amendment
preempted Plaintiffs' claims for:
(1) breach of contract for carriage;
(2) common law fraud; (3) violating
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act,
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1 (West
1997); (4) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (5) breach of
contract; and (6) willful and wanton
misconduct.
The district court granted partial
summary judgment to United
because it determined that neither
punitive damages nor emotional
distress damages were recoverable
under the Carmack Amendment.
However, the court allowed the
claim for economic damages to go
to the jury; the jury found in favor
of Plaintiffs. The jury found that
some of the lost photographs had a
fair economic market value of
$52,500 and that the other
photographs lacked a fair economic
market value, but for purposes of
establishing damages, the jury
valued them at $7,050 for a total
damage award of $59,550.
Both parties appealed. Plaintiffs
asserted that they also were entitled
to punitive and emotional distress
damages. Plaintiffs argued that the
Carmack Amendment did not
preempt their state law claims
because these claims alleged an
independent harm, separate from
the actual loss of cargo. United's
cross-appeal claimed that since the
Carmack Amendment strictly
prohibited the recovery of "non-
economic" damages, the court
should dismiss the $7,050 award as
"6non-economic."
The Carmack Amendment
Does Not Permit Recovery of
Punitive Damages
Since the Carmack Amendment
lacked any substantive legislative
history, the Seventh Circuit relied
on the plain language of the statute
and previous appellate court
decisions to determine whether the
Carmack Amendment allowed for
the recovery of punitive damages.
The Second Circuit determined that
holding common carriers liable for
punitive damages under the
Carmack Amendment would
undermine the amendment's
purpose to eliminate the uncertainty
of recoverable damages when cargo
is lost or damaged. See Cleveland v.
Beltman North American Co., 30
F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1994). More
importantly, the Second Circuit
decided that Congress did not
intend for federal common law to
add to the rules and regulations
already adopted for interstate
shipments.
Conversely, the Fourth Circuit
permitted recovery of punitive and
emotional distress damages in a
private action. See Hubbard v.
Allied Van Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d
1224 (4th Cir. 1976). The court
there looked to the recodified
savings clause in the Carmack
Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 15103,
which omitted the word "full" from
the phrase "full actual loss." The
Hubbard court determined that the
actual loss "could not be restricted
by contract or tariff, while
additional liability could be."
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
construed the Carmack Amendment
to allow the recovery of punitive
damages.
The Seventh Circuit agreed with
the Second Circuit's analysis and
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conclusion: the legislature intended
the Carmack Amendment to
provide uniformity in the rules and
regulations for common carriers and
predictability in determining the
extent of liability for lost or
damaged cargo. Thus, the Seventh
Circuit denied recovery of punitive
damages under the Carmack
Amendment, claiming that such an
award would displace the
Amendment's purpose.
Carmack Amendment Does
Not Absolutely Preempt State
Law and Common Law
Claims
Seventh Circuit precedent held
that the Carmack Amendment
preempts "state and common law
remedies.., where goods are
damaged or lost in interstate
commerce." Hughes v. United Van
Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir.
1987). Following this precedent, the
Seventh Circuit held that the
Carmack Amendment preempted
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of
contract for a common carrier and
willful and wanton misconduct
because the alleged damages in
these claims stemmed from the
damages to Slavin's property
already covered by the Carmack
Amendment. The Seventh Circuit
also held that the Carmack
Amendment preempted the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act, although
some states do not hold such claims
preempted. In so holding, the
Seventh Circuit deferred to the only
Illinois appellate court to consider
the issue. The Illinois appellate
court in Nowakowski v. American
Red Ball Transit Co., 288 111. App.
3d 348 (1997) found that the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act is
preempted by the Carmack
Amendment.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit
determined that the Carmack
Amendment did not preempt all of
Plaintiffs' state law claims. The
Seventh Circuit found that
Plaintiffs' intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim was not
preempted by the Carmack
Amendment because that claim
reflects a separate and independent
harm. In addition, the court, relying
on previous First Circuit and
Seventh Circuit decisions, also
recognized that the Carmack
Amendment did not preempt state
law claims that were separate from
the "actual loss of or damage to
cargo." See Rini v. United Van
Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.
1997); North American Van Lines,
Inc. v. Pinkerton Security Sys., Inc.,
89 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 1996); and
Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc.,
829 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1987).
Court Rejected United's
Cross-Appeal
Finally, the Seventh Circuit
addressed United's cross-appeal
where United alleged that the
$7,050 jury award was a "non-
economic" amount, and that the
Carmack Amendment strictly
prohibited the recovery of "non-
economic" damages. The court
disagreed. The jury in this case had
heard expert testimony from both
sides as to the potential value of the
photographs. Further, the jury
instructions specifically prohibited
the jury from considering "fanciful
or sentimental value" in assessing
the economic damages. The court
found that the jury acted within
these boundaries in awarding
Plaintiffs $7,050. This award was
economic and not based on "non-
economic" factors such as
sentiment. NOW
Right to Jury Trial Found Under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act
By Heather Ann Miller
In Kobs v. Arrow Service
Bureau, Inc., 134 F.3d 893 (7th
Cir. 1998), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that a jury may determine the
statutory additional damages
provision of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act
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("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a)(2)(A).
Collection Agency's Conduct:
Within Or Beyond the Law?
Plaintiffs, Ron and Stacie Kobs
("Plaintiffs"), brought suit against
Defendant, Arrow Service Bureau,
Inc. ("Arrow"), alleging that Arrow
violated Plaintiffs' rights under the
FDCPA when it attempted to collect
a debt allegedly owed by Plaintiffs
to American TV. Arrow, a debt
collection agency, had previously
purchased debts owed to American
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